The US-Bangladesh Trade and Investment Cooperation Framework Agreement (TICFA), signed on February 9, 2026, just days before national elections under the interim government, is shrouded in secrecy and ostensibly aims to reduce tariffs on Bangladeshi exports to the US, particularly garments. However, a deeper examination by political analyst Kallol Mustafa reveals it disproportionately favours US interests, imposing stringent conditions that undermine Bangladesh’s economic sovereignty, agricultural security, and foreign policy independence. The agreement could lead to huge financial losses through revenue shortfalls, increased import costs, and market dominance by US firms, while making Bangladesh more vulnerable to geopolitical pressures and domestic industry disruptions.
Drawing from the agreement’s text (including articles, annexes, and sections), I highlight how the deal’s one-sided nature—lacking robust negotiations seen in similar pacts like the US-Malaysia agreement—exacerbates these risks. Below, I break it down using subheads focused on the strict conditions and hidden items, as these elements are central to the vulnerabilities and losses.
Strict Conditions: Tariff concessions and market access obligations
The deal mandates massive tariff reductions for US goods entering Bangladesh, creating an uneven playing field that could flood local markets and erode domestic industries.
– Extensive Tariff Cuts for US Products: Bangladesh must provide duty-free access to 6,710 US products while receiving concessions on only 1,638 items. Immediately upon enforcement, 4,500 US products (EIF category) gain zero tariffs, including livestock, meat, fish, chemicals, textiles, machinery, and industrial goods. Another 1,539 products (B-5 category) see duties halved initially, phasing to zero over four years, and 672 items (B-10) follow a nine-year phase-out. This could result in annual revenue losses of billions in taka from import duties, weakening fiscal stability and exposing local agriculture and manufacturing to cheaper US imports (Schedule 1, Annex 1).
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– Non-Tariff Barrier Removals: Bangladesh is prohibited from using import licensing policies that hinder US goods (Article 2.2). US industrial and medical products approved in the US (e.g., FDA-certified) bypass Bangladeshi testing and marketing approvals (Annex 3, Section 1). This includes accepting US vehicles meeting federal safety standards (Article 1.2, Annex 3) and lifting bans on US remanufactured goods or parts (Article 1.3, Annex 3). Such conditions strip Bangladesh of regulatory tools to protect consumer safety and local standards, potentially leading to substandard imports and health risks.
– Agricultural and Biotech Mandates: US sanitary and phytosanitary standards must be recognised as equivalents, allowing untested US food and agricultural products entry (Article 1.4, Annex 3). Poultry, meat, and eggs follow USDA inspections without local checks (Article 1.5, Annex 3). Within 24 months, Bangladesh must enact policies for seamless entry of US biotech products without testing or labelling (Article 1.6, Annex 3). Even if a US region faces avian influenza, imports from areas beyond 10km remain unrestricted (Article 1.8, Annex 3). These rules could devastate local farmers by introducing genetically modified organisms (GMOs) without safeguards, risking biodiversity and public health while increasing dependency on US supplies.
Compared to the US-Malaysia deal, these conditions are far stricter; Malaysia retained discretion under its own laws for biotech imports (Article 2.11, Annex 3), avoiding mandatory timelines and labelling waivers.
Strict Conditions: Mandatory purchases and subsidy restrictions
The agreement enforces compulsory imports from the US at potentially inflated costs, straining Bangladesh’s foreign reserves and limiting policy flexibility.
– Obligatory High-Value Imports: Bangladesh must buy 14 Boeing aircraft, $15 billion (Tk180,000 crore) in US energy (mainly LNG) over 15 years, and $3.5 billion (Tk42,000 crore) in agricultural products. This includes 700,000 tons of wheat annually for five years and $1.25 billion (2.6 million tons) in soybeans within one year. Military equipment purchases from the US must increase, reducing buys from others (Section 6, Annex 3). Given higher US shipping costs and times compared to alternatives (e.g., from Russia or Ukraine), this could inflate import bills by 20-30%, leading to annual losses of hundreds of crores while diverting funds from development.
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– Subsidy and Incentive Curbs: State-owned enterprises cannot receive non-commercial aid or subsidies (Article 5.2). Bangladesh must disclose all manufacturing subsidies to the US upon request and eliminate those distorting competition. Within six months of enforcement, full subsidy details must be submitted to the WTO (Section 6, Annex 3). Fisheries subsidies must align with WTO rules, reforming “harmful” ones (Article 1.23, Annex 3). This hampers support for nascent industries, potentially causing job losses in sectors like fisheries and manufacturing, where subsidies are vital for competitiveness against US giants.
In contrast, Malaysia’s agreement limits subsidy disclosures to non-confidential data (Article 6.2) and avoids WTO submission deadlines, preserving more autonomy.
Hidden Items: Geopolitical entanglements and sovereignty erosion
Beyond economic terms, the deal embeds clauses that subtly integrate Bangladesh into US strategic orbits, hidden under trade language, increasing vulnerability to external pressures.
– National Security Alignment: Bangladesh must adopt “complementary restrictions” mirroring US border or trade measures for national security (Article 4.1). It must enforce US export controls and sanctions, preventing violations (Articles 1-5, Section 3). Ports, terminals, and logistics must use tech preventing data leaks to third countries, and “harmful” software for US security must be limited. This forces Bangladesh into US-led conflicts (e.g., with China or Russia), risking trade retaliation and diplomatic isolation without reciprocal benefits.
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– Restrictions on Third-Country Deals: Bangladesh cannot sign agreements with third countries containing “unscientific, discriminatory, or biased” standards harming US exports (Article 2.3). Digital trade pacts detrimental to US interests allow deal termination and high tariffs (Article 3.2). Free trade or preferential deals with “non-market” economies (e.g., China, Russia) that “devalue” this agreement trigger penalties (Article 4.3). Nuclear reactors, fuel rods, or enriched uranium from “risky” countries are barred, except pre-existing contracts (Article 4.3). These clauses covertly veto Bangladesh’s foreign partnerships, limiting diversification and exposing it to US veto power—absent in Malaysia’s pact, which emphasises mutual consultation (Article 3.3).
– Equal Treatment for US Firms: US investors in mining, energy exports, power, telecom, transport, and infrastructure get national treatment equivalent to local firms (Article 5.1). No investment caps in oil and gas, insurance, or telecom (Article 1.16, Annex 3). US insurers are exempt from reinsuring 50% with state corporations (Article 1.15, Annex 3). This hidden dominance could crowd out local players, leading to profit outflows and reduced control over strategic sectors, with potential losses in sovereignty over resources like gas exports even amid domestic shortages.
Malaysia negotiated better, tying cooperation to its laws (Article 6.1) without mandating equal treatment or removing caps in sensitive areas.
Overall Vulnerabilities And Projected Losses
This TICFA transforms a trade pact into a tool of US economic and geopolitical leverage, making Bangladesh vulnerable to market dumping, health risks from untested imports, and forced alignment in global rivalries. Economic losses could exceed $20-30 billion over 15 years from higher import costs, revenue shortfalls (estimated 10-15% drop in duties), and subsidy eliminations, while displacing local jobs and industries. Unlike Malaysia, which secured balanced terms through negotiation, Bangladesh’s interim government failed to protect its interests, yielding to one-sided demands. The new BNP government should urgently review and amend via a parliamentary committee before enforcement (Article 6.6), to mitigate these risks and reclaim sovereignty.
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