Amid mounting international pressure for a participatory and inclusive national election on February 12, Bangladesh’s banned Awami League appears to be steadily rebuilding its political leverage through high-level diplomatic outreach and renewed public signalling from exile under the leadership of five-time Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina.
Journalist Kazi Runa’s latest analysis highlights the interim government’s palpable anxiety over the League’s resurgence, particularly as the party leverages meetings with foreign diplomats to argue that its exclusion risks empowering fundamentalist forces and destabilising regional balance.
The analysis notes that the interim administration, led by Chief Adviser Muhammad Yunus, seems far more invested in securing a strong “Yes” vote in the concurrent referendum on the July National Charter than in the credibility of the parliamentary election itself.
As Runa observes: “Just as a bamboo shoot is bigger than the bamboo, in Bangladesh’s 13th national parliamentary election, the interim government prefers the referendum far more than the vote.” Government-aligned parties, meanwhile, remain focused on seat-sharing deals under the banner of a “level playing field,” leaving ordinary citizens largely indifferent to both processes.
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The interim government’s primary concerns revolve around two issues: international perceptions of what critics call a tightly controlled and exclusionary electoral exercise and the unpredictable actions of the Awami League, which remains officially banned from contesting.
Worry over the League has intensified in recent weeks following a series of off-the-record meetings between its senior leaders—both in India and in Western capitals—and ambassadors from key countries, especially the United States and European nations. In these engagements, Awami League representatives have consistently warned that sidelining the party would create a political vacuum conducive to radical elements and undermine regional stability.
This diplomatic campaign gained visible momentum on January 17, when two former Awami League ministers—Hasan Mahmud and Mohibul Hasan Chowdhury Nowfel—held a press conference at the Press Club of India in Delhi. The event, organised under the banner of the International Crimes Research Foundation (ICRF) and a London-based law firm, presented a rebuttal to a UN Human Rights High Commissioner’s Office report on the July–August 2024 protests. While organisers insisted it was not an official Awami League function, it marked the first such public appearance by party figures on Indian soil in 17 months since the government’s fall on August 5, 2024.
The diplomatic push now appears poised for a significant escalation. Rumours had circulated that Awami League President Sheikh Hasina would personally address a January 23 event in Delhi’s Mathura area, titled “Safe Democracy in Bangladesh,” organised by the Foreign Correspondents’ Club of South Asia. Reliable sources, however, confirm that Sheikh Hasina will not attend in person; instead, an audio message from her will open the program (scheduled from 6pm to 7pm), with in-person participation by Human Rights Watch Secretary General Engineer Mohammad A. Siddique and former Education Minister Nowfel, and virtual appearances by several other senior Awami League figures.
Runa suggests the audio message—shaped by the recent diplomatic interactions—could deliver a fresh or sharpened statement on the February 12 election. Although the party has already called for a boycott and Sheikh Hasina has repeatedly asserted in media interviews that the League wishes to participate but has been barred by executive order due to fears of its enduring popularity, the timing raises speculation about a potential recalibration or intensified call to action.
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Signs of the League’s re-emerging street-level strength are already visible. After months of suppression—including police crackdowns, officer transfers, and pressure to halt flash processions—Awami League activists resumed street marches in the past two days. Intelligence sources indicate a larger show of force could begin as early as January 25. A senior police official warned that overlapping election campaigning (starting January 22) with anti-election street activity could severely strain law enforcement resources and complicate crowd control.
The party’s strategy, according to intelligence assessments, is to amplify domestically and internationally the message that an election without the Awami League’s grassroots participation cannot be considered genuinely democratic. The boycott call, previously confined to online platforms and internal networks, is now transitioning to visible field programs. Party sources suggest Sheikh Hasina may use her forthcoming audio message to announce specific courses of action.
The interim government’s apparent indifference to deteriorating law and order—exemplified by a January 19 gunfight in which a RAB member was killed and several others taken hostage by terrorists, just one day after the Home Minister claimed looted police weapons posed no election threat—further underscores the volatile environment in which the Awami League is reasserting itself.
Kazi Runa concludes with a stark question: In such a fragile security landscape, if the Awami League chooses to openly demonstrate its organizational muscle rather than exercise restraint, how profoundly disruptive—and uncomfortable—will that prove for the interim government’s much-vaunted “historic” vote and referendum? As diplomatic calls for inclusivity grow louder, the coming days may reveal whether Sheikh Hasina’s January 23 message marks a turning point in the party’s campaign to reclaim legitimacy on the national stage.