The issue of providing a โhumanitarian corridorโ for Myanmarโs Rakhine state has long been a hot topic of political debate in Bangladesh. Recently, the United Nations reiterated its call for Bangladesh to provide such a humanitarian corridor, arguing that if humanitarian aid is not sent as soon as possible, the ordinary people living in Rakhine will be at risk of severe famine.
The provision of this assistance is crucial to the protection of civilians in Rakhine who are trapped in the ongoing conflict between the Myanmar junta government and the Arakan Army. In response to the UNโs appeal, the interim government of Bangladesh has agreed to provide a โhumanitarian corridorโ with conditions, a foreign affairs adviser told the media a few days ago. However, the decision has faced widespread criticism from politicians, security analysts, regional partner states, and the general public.
Many parties have expressed deep concerns about whether Bangladesh would be at risk of national and border security if such a corridor were provided, the possibility of a new influx of Rohingya refugees, the possibility of the rise of extremism in Bangladesh, the increase in human trafficking and the risk of Bangladesh becoming a hotspot for illegal cross-border trade. In the meantime, many government officials have again denied the decision to provide such a corridor.
Whether the government decides to provide the corridor or not, this article analyses the advantages and disadvantages of providing such a humanitarian corridor for Rakhine.
Beyond the advantages or disadvantages of providing the corridor, there is a debate about whether the current interim government consulted with Bangladeshi political parties before deciding to provide the humanitarian corridor, and whether the Bangladesh army was consulted on this issue.
Many have also raised the question of whether the interim government has the power and jurisdiction to make such a decision. I will not go into this debate because, first and foremost, even if Bangladesh agrees to provide a humanitarian corridor to Myanmar, in principle, the UN cannot implement it without Myanmarโs consent.
Moreover, the possibility of Myanmar’s consent is very low because the Arakan Army will benefit from this arrangement, and Myanmar will not take any decision to strengthen the Arakan Army. The main point is that neither Bangladesh nor the UN can implement this โhumanitarian corridorโ project without the consent of the Myanmar Army. Therefore, the matter is not as simple as it seems.
The matter is not at all that Bangladesh will give something, the UN will take it, and the project will be implemented.
Without the consent of Myanmar and the Myanmar Army, it will not work even if it is imposed on Bangladesh. This is simple arithmetic. Beyond that, there is complex geopolitical algebra and geometry. But here I will briefly discuss the benefits and challenges of providing such a humanitarian corridor.
Benefits of providing a corridor
Firstly, if such a humanitarian corridor is provided to help civilians in Rakhine State, Bangladesh will receive great praise worldwide. It will receive a lot of applause from human rights organisations and the international community. Bangladesh also received a lot of praise for opening the border in 2017. This will be a significant benefit for the current interim government, which will enhance its image internationally and make the governmentโs position in power more sustainable and stronger.
Secondly, if this humanitarian corridor develops a positive relationship between Bangladesh and the Arakan Army and if there is a possibility of establishing a democratic government in Myanmar instead of military rule in the future, then the establishment of this corridor can play a helpful and constructive role in the repatriation of Rohingya refugees living in Bangladesh. Although it depends on numerous โifs and butsโ, it can be very important for the future.
Thirdly, if this humanitarian corridor is provided under the auspices of the UN, it will strengthen Bangladesh’s position in the UN, which will further enhance the positive image of the Bangladesh Army in global peacekeeping missions. As a result, the deployment of the Bangladesh Army in UN peacekeeping missions may increase further. Since participation in UN peacekeeping missions is an important issue for the Bangladesh Army, the establishment of such a corridor will undoubtedly strengthen Bangladesh’s position in UN peacekeeping policy.
Fourthly, if food supply cannot be provided quickly through the humanitarian corridor, then, according to the UN’s statement, if a famine situation really arises in Rakhine, then there is every possibility that about 500,000 Rohingya living in Rakhine will re-enter Bangladesh. Consequently, if a possible famine can be prevented through the humanitarian corridor, it will be possible to stop the new influx of Rohingya.
Challenges of providing the corridor
Apart from these four possible benefits, I do not see any other benefits for Bangladesh. But on the contrary, the challenges that Bangladesh will face in providing such a humanitarian corridor could be very extensive. I will mention only four main challenges here.
First, establishing a humanitarian corridor without a bilateral agreement with Myanmar and without the consent of the Myanmar army will put Bangladesh in a conflictual relationship with Myanmar, which will inevitably create a war-like environment, which will not be beneficial for Bangladesh. Providing a humanitarian corridor for Rakhine means providing a kind of support to the Arakan Army. And providing any kind of support to the Arakan Army means taking a stand against the Myanmar state and its army. Therefore, any possibility of war between Bangladesh and Myanmar can lead to terrible consequences, and Bangladesh will have to pay a heavy price for it.
Second, there will be a huge crisis regarding Bangladeshโs national security, especially who will operate this corridor, who will maintain it, and who will supervise border security, which will be a very important question. Opening this corridor could pose a threat to Bangladeshโs national security and regional stability, which may seem like a bigger concern. In addition, it could be used for various geopolitical manoeuvres by the Western world, including the United States, which could create a major security threat to Bangladesh.
This situation could make Bangladesh the centre of global geopolitics at the expense of its citizens and their safety.
Third, facilitating the creation of such a humanitarian corridor could create new tensions with two regional powers: China and India. Moreover, the risk cannot be ruled out that the United States, with the support of the United Nations, could use this corridor to establish a new position in South and Southeast Asia, which could lead to a sharp deterioration in Bangladeshโs relations with both India and China.
Fourth, opening such a corridor could further worsen the border situation. Fighting between the Arakan Army and the Myanmar army is still ongoing. Moreover, who will guarantee that humanitarian aid will reach the common people and not the Arakan Army?
As a result, if such a corridor is opened, there is a possibility of losses to the UN personnel, which can create an environment of a three-way war in Rakhine. And if such an environment of a three-way war is created, the Rohingya living in Rakhine will easily enter Bangladesh through the corridor. Hence, this corridor will create a new route for the Rohingya influx instead of stopping it.
Finally, I think that the amount of time, brains and intellectual energy that Bangladeshi media, intellectuals, academics and prominent security analysts have spent on this humanitarian corridor issue was not necessary considering the complex realities. Historical precedent suggests that even if Bangladesh wanted to, the UN would not be able to easily establish such a humanitarian corridor.
Moreover, even if Bangladesh were willing, the successful implementation of such a decision at the international level, even within the legal framework of the UN, would face significant challenges. However, I also recognise that public debate, protest and expression of concerns are very important. Such debate, protest and criticism are essential in protecting national sovereignty, security and public interest. Public sentiment often plays a significant role in national decision-making, and nurturing this sentiment is a meaningful act of civic engagement.
I sincerely hope that the government will recognise the importance of public opinion and make decisions after carefully considering the voice of the people. This will ultimately benefit both the country and the UN.
Dr Rahman Nasir Uddin: Visiting Scholar, Harvard University; Professor, Department of Anthropology, Chittagong University.
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