By Dr. Akash Mazumder, PK Sarker
Abstract:
This research investigates the constitutional provisions and political dynamics surrounding the authority of the President of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh to dissolve the Jatiya Sangsad (National Parliament), particularly under Article 72 of the Constitution. While the Constitution provides the President with the formal power to dissolve Parliament, this authority is conditional upon the advice of the Prime Minister. This study provides a comprehensive examination of the constitutional text, judicial interpretations, and historical precedents to assess the extent and limits of presidential discretion.
Through a detailed literature review, theoretical analysis based on constitutionalism and separation of powers, and a methodology involving qualitative case study review, this paper interrogates the procedural, legal, and political factors that shape this executive-legislative relationship. It also contextualizes the President’s role within Bangladesh’s broader political framework, which is often dominated by party loyalty and executive centralization. The paper ultimately argues that the President’s power to dissolve Parliament is largely ceremonial and constrained by constitutional mandates, with significant implications for democratic governance, checks and balances, and political stability in Bangladesh.
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This study explores the constitutional and political dimensions of Article 72 of the Constitution of Bangladesh, which governs the dissolution of Parliament and the scope of presidential authority. Through a detailed examination of the constitutional text, historical precedents, and judicial interpretations, the paper interrogates the balance of power between the President and the Prime Minister in parliamentary dissolution. It argues that while Bangladesh adopts a parliamentary system where executive powers are concentrated in the Prime Minister, the ceremonial role of the President in dissolving Parliament carries significant implications for democratic governance and constitutionalism. The analysis highlights how Article 72, although seemingly procedural, has been shaped by political crises, caretaker government transitions, and periods of authoritarian influence. By conducting a comparative analysis with other parliamentary democracies, the paper identifies the uniqueness of Bangladesh’s constitutional design and the tensions between formal constitutional provisions and political practice. The research finds that presidential authority under Article 72, though constitutionally restrained by the requirement of prime ministerial advice, can become a site of political contestation, particularly during moments of democratic backsliding.
The study concludes that a more robust constitutional jurisprudence and institutional safeguards are essential to prevent the misuse of dissolution powers and to uphold democratic stability in Bangladesh.
Keywords: Article 72, Bangladesh Constitution, Presidential Authority, Parliamentary Dissolution, Prime Ministerial Advice, Constitutionalism, Political Crisis, Judicial Review, Caretaker Government, Comparative Constitutional Law.
1. Introduction
The Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, adopted in 1972 and amended multiple times since, sets out the framework for the functioning of the government and delineates the powers of various constitutional offices, including the President and the Prime Minister. A key area of interest within this framework is Article 72, which outlines the provisions regarding the dissolution of the Jatiya Sangsad (National Parliament). This provision situates the President’s authority to dissolve Parliament within a strict legal structure, wherein the President may act only upon the advice of the Prime Minister. Thus, the apparent authority vested in the President is significantly circumscribed by the principle of responsible government.
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The importance of this topic has increased in recent years due to heightened political polarization in Bangladesh and contested interpretations of constitutional provisions during election cycles. With the reemergence of debates around presidential powers, democratic accountability, and the role of caretaker governance, it is critical to examine how Article 72 functions in both letter and spirit. At the heart of this issue lies a fundamental question: Can the President dissolve the Parliament unilaterally, or must such action always be undertaken on the advice of the Prime Minister?
This study begins with a textual analysis of Article 72 and related provisions, such as Articles 48 and 55, to clarify the constitutional hierarchy and authority structure. It then explores the historical precedents and political circumstances under which Parliament has been dissolved in Bangladesh. Furthermore, the study investigates the broader implications of these provisions for democratic theory, particularly in the context of executive authority, parliamentary sovereignty, and the principle of checks and balances.
The introduction part proceeds by situating the topic within the broader landscape of constitutional law and political practice in South Asia, where parliamentary democracies often confront tensions between formal constitutional rules and informal political norms. Comparative examples from India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka are briefly referenced to highlight similarities and contrasts in the role of heads of state in dissolving Parliament.
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Additionally, the introduction sets the stage for subsequent parts by outlining the central research questions:
What are the constitutional provisions regarding the dissolution of Parliament by the President in Bangladesh?
How has the interpretation of these provisions evolved over time?
What role do political factors play in the application or circumvention of these constitutional rules?
What theoretical frameworks best help explain the constrained authority of the President?
How do judicial interventions and precedents shape the practical operation of Article 72?
These questions inform the structure and flow of the paper. The introduction concludes with an overview of the methodology adopted, which includes doctrinal legal analysis, case study reviews, and theoretical interpretation.
“Presidential Powers and Parliamentary Sovereignty in Bangladesh: Constitutional Limits on Dissolution Without Prime Ministerial Advice”
2. Literature Review
The balance of power between the President and the Prime Minister in parliamentary democracies has been the subject of wide-ranging academic discussion, particularly in post-colonial South Asian nations like Bangladesh. In this context, the power to dissolve Parliament—an essential constitutional mechanism—reveals a critical fault line between ceremonial and executive functions. This literature review traces historical trajectories, judicial precedents, political commentaries, and comparative perspectives in relation to the constitutional principle that the President of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh cannot dissolve Parliament without the advice of the Prime Minister, especially under Article 72 of the Constitution.
2.1 Origins of the Parliamentary System in Bangladesh
The parliamentary form of governance in Bangladesh is a legacy of British colonial rule and the Westminster model. Scholars such as Ahmed (2018) argue that the 1972 Constitution of Bangladesh was inspired by the Westminster system, but uniquely adapted to address the country’s post-independence political challenges. The framers of the Constitution envisioned a ceremonial presidency and an executive-headed government led by the Prime Minister (Chowdhury, 1995). As such, provisions like Article 72, which empower the President to dissolve Parliament only upon the Prime Minister’s advice, are in line with classical parliamentary doctrines.
Ahmed (2012) notes that the original 1972 Constitution made the President a symbolic figurehead, while executive authority lay with the Prime Minister and the Cabinet. However, constitutional amendments in the subsequent decades (especially the Fourth and Twelfth Amendments) periodically shifted the balance of power, leading to academic debates about the erosion of checks and balances in the political system (Huq, 2008).
2.2 Constitutional Provisions on Dissolution
Article 72 of the Bangladesh Constitution is central to the debate on the President’s power to dissolve Parliament. Article 72(1) clearly states: “The President shall dissolve Parliament if so advised by the Prime Minister.” This provision underscores the President’s role as largely formal and procedural in this respect. Scholars like Rahman (2017) and Mahmud (2013) have emphasized that this language removes any discretionary power from the President regarding dissolution, affirming the supremacy of the Prime Minister in parliamentary matters.
According to Islam (2015), this provision was designed to ensure political stability and protect against arbitrary or autocratic behavior by the President, which was a concern due to the political turbulence experienced during the early years of Bangladesh’s independence. The President, being indirectly elected and often affiliated with the ruling party, has minimal democratic legitimacy to override the decision of an elected Prime Minister.
Legal scholars such as Bhuiyan (2020) have further clarified that the President’s role is akin to a constitutional automaton in this context: bound to act on advice, not judgment. Any deviation from this protocol could be deemed unconstitutional and subject to judicial review under Articles 7 and 111 of the Constitution.
2.3 Historical Precedents and Political Crisis
Though the Constitution provides clarity on the procedural limitation of the President’s powers, the practice of governance in Bangladesh has witnessed significant deviations. The political crises of 1996 and 2007 are illustrative. During these periods, the President’s role in handling parliamentary and electoral transitions came under scrutiny. Scholars like Jahan (2011) have critically evaluated these events, arguing that political pressures and extra-constitutional forces often manipulate constitutional procedures to justify controversial decisions.
In the 2007 caretaker government crisis, President Iajuddin Ahmed controversially assumed the role of Chief Adviser to the caretaker government, a move criticized for violating the principle of neutrality and the separation of powers. Though not directly involving the dissolution of Parliament, this episode demonstrated the elasticity of constitutional norms under political duress (Zillur, 2008).
The scholarly consensus indicates that while Article 72 formally restrains the President, political realities and informal power structures may override constitutional mandates in practice. In this context, Hossain (2014) argues that the symbolic role of the President may become politically significant during constitutional impasses, especially when institutional checks are weak or compromised.
2.4 Doctrine of Ministerial Advice in Comparative Perspective
The requirement that the President acts on the advice of the Prime Minister is not unique to Bangladesh. It is a key tenet of the Westminster model, replicated in countries like India, Pakistan, and the UK. In India, for instance, Article 74(1) of the Constitution mandates that the President shall act according to the advice of the Council of Ministers. The landmark case Samsher Singh v. State of Punjab (1974) confirmed that the Indian President is bound by ministerial advice, even in executive appointments and legislative matters.
Similarly, in Pakistan, the Constitution under Article 48 requires the President to act on the Prime Minister’s advice in most cases, though the 18th Amendment has expanded parliamentary checks on presidential overreach. According to Malik (2011), these provisions are meant to uphold the sovereignty of the elected legislature and limit ceremonial roles from assuming political agency.
In the Bangladeshi context, Rahman and Karim (2019) argue that comparative jurisprudence reinforces the view that unilateral presidential action, especially in matters as grave as parliamentary dissolution, would constitute a violation of both legal norms and democratic principles. The literature underscores that even ceremonial figures must adhere to constitutional constraints to preserve institutional legitimacy.
2.5 Judicial Interpretations and the Role of the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court of Bangladesh plays a critical role in interpreting constitutional provisions, especially when political disputes arise. Several landmark judgments have reiterated the principle that the President cannot act independently of the Prime Minister’s advice. In Secretary, Ministry of Finance v. Md. Masdar Hossain (1999), the Supreme Court emphasized the separation of powers doctrine and reiterated that the executive must function within constitutional boundaries.
Further, in Abdul Mannan Khan v. Government of Bangladesh (2003), the judiciary reaffirmed the supremacy of the Prime Minister in executive decisions. While these cases did not directly address Article 72, they form a body of constitutional jurisprudence that supports the subordination of the President to parliamentary authority.
Chowdhury (2021) emphasizes that the judiciary has repeatedly ruled in favor of preserving the parliamentary character of the Constitution and limiting any expansionist tendencies by the President. However, the literature also warns of the politicization of the judiciary, where constitutional interpretation may be influenced by prevailing power dynamics.
2.6 Theoretical Debates: Ceremonial vs. Executive Presidency
The dichotomy between ceremonial and executive presidency is central to constitutional theory. Sartori (1994) distinguishes between figurehead Presidents who symbolize national unity and those who exercise real executive power. In Bangladesh, the 1991 Twelfth Amendment transformed the state from a presidential to a parliamentary system, thereby reinforcing the ceremonial character of the Presidency.
Jahan and Amundsen (2012) argue that constitutional amendments and political practice must align for the ceremonial model to function effectively. The President’s inability to dissolve Parliament unilaterally is a constitutional safeguard to protect democratic representation. Any deviation from this norm could signal a drift toward authoritarianism, as experienced during military-backed regimes in Bangladesh’s past.
Additionally, theoretical frameworks provided by constitutional scholars such as Barber (2001) and Lijphart (1999) offer insights into institutional design and power distribution in parliamentary democracies. These works support the principle that ceremonial heads must not disrupt legislative continuity, especially in fragile democracies where political instability can undermine governance.
2.7 Critiques and Contentions in Political Literature
Despite legal clarity, a growing body of literature critiques the manipulation of constitutional provisions for political gains. Sarker (2020) explores how constitutional ambiguities and vague terminologies are sometimes weaponized to facilitate regime survival. For example, the phrase “if advised by the Prime Minister” in Article 72, while clear, may become subject to competing interpretations in politically volatile contexts.
This literature also includes voices from political science and civil society. Nasir (2016) examines how power asymmetries between political parties and state institutions can distort constitutional norms. The marginalization of opposition voices in parliamentary debate creates a de facto executive dominance, potentially compromising democratic procedures, including those around dissolution.
Furthermore, several think-tanks and watchdog organizations (e.g., Transparency International Bangladesh, 2022) have criticized the opacity in executive decision-making processes. These reports suggest that constitutional mechanisms are often undermined by informal political networks and bureaucratic complicity, especially during election seasons.
2.8 Summary and Research Gap
The reviewed literature provides robust evidence that the President of Bangladesh is constitutionally restrained from dissolving Parliament without the advice of the Prime Minister. The scholarly consensus emphasizes constitutional fidelity, historical precedents, and comparative jurisprudence to reinforce this point. However, gaps remain in empirical studies exploring how these constitutional norms are practiced in real-time political crises. There is also limited research on public perception of presidential power and its potential misuse under informal political arrangements.
This paper aims to bridge that gap by combining doctrinal analysis with empirical insights into the interplay between constitutional norms and political practices. It also critically examines how attempts to circumvent the advice-based dissolution clause could destabilize parliamentary democracy in Bangladesh.
3. Theoretical Framework
3.1 Introduction
The constitutional framework of any democracy rests fundamentally on a set of principles that govern the organization, distribution, and exercise of political power. In parliamentary democracies like Bangladesh, the theory of constitutionalism and the doctrine of separation of powers shape the contours of executive authority, parliamentary sovereignty, and the role of symbolic state heads, such as the President. This part develops a rigorous theoretical lens through which the constitutional position of the President vis-à-vis the dissolution of Parliament under Article 72 of the Constitution of Bangladesh may be understood.
Through an interdisciplinary review combining political theory, constitutional law, and comparative constitutional analysis, this part provides a foundation for the normative and empirical inquiry that follows. Key concepts such as constitutionalism, separation of powers, parliamentary sovereignty, executive accountability, and judicial review will be examined with particular emphasis on their application to the dissolution power in Bangladesh’s constitutional order.
3.2 Constitutionalism: The Rule of Law and Limited Government
At its core, constitutionalism is the idea that government authority must be exercised in accordance with pre-established legal norms and constraints (Dicey, 1885; Waldron, 2006). It entails the subordination of all government branches, including executives and legislatures, to a supreme constitution that guarantees rights, liberties, and the proper organization of power (Bingham, 2010).
3.2.1 Definition and Dimensions
As Waldron (2006) articulates, constitutionalism goes beyond having a written constitution; it requires adherence to the rule of law—laws must be publicly known, clear, stable, and equally applied. This principle rejects arbitrary use of power and emphasizes institutional checks.
Key dimensions of constitutionalism include:
Limited Government: Government powers are restricted and defined by law (Raz, 1979).
Separation of Powers: Distributing powers among legislative, executive, and judiciary branches to avoid concentration.
Popular Sovereignty: Ultimate political authority rests with the people.
Protection of Fundamental Rights: Constitutions enshrine and protect civil liberties.
3.2.2 Constitutionalism in Postcolonial Contexts
In postcolonial states like Bangladesh, constitutionalism carries added significance. The transition from colonial rule to self-rule entails establishing sovereign legal orders that balance inherited colonial frameworks and indigenous political realities (Choudhry, 2008). Bangladesh’s Constitution of 1972 reflects this hybrid character, combining parliamentary democracy with safeguards responsive to social, political, and economic challenges.
However, as Lijphart (1999) cautions, constitutionalism in new democracies faces obstacles such as elite dominance, weak institutions, and fragile rule of law, creating tensions around constitutional supremacy—particularly where executive power risks encroachment.
3.3 Separation of Powers: The Distribution and Balance of Authority
The doctrine of separation of powers—initially articulated by Montesquieu (1748)—posits that political power must be divided among distinct branches of government to prevent tyranny and ensure liberty. This framework informs the design of modern constitutional democracies by assigning different functions to the legislature, executive, and judiciary.
3.3.1 Montesquieu’s Theory and Modern Adaptations
Montesquieu argued that political liberty depends on the mutual independence and checks among government branches (Montesquieu, 1748/1989). In practice, pure separation is impossible; therefore, modern constitutions embody a functional separation with overlapping and interdependent powers (Shapiro, 2005).
For parliamentary systems, this separation is complicated by the fusion of executive and legislative branches, as the Prime Minister and Cabinet emerge from Parliament, making a strict horizontal division less applicable.
3.3.2 Separation of Powers in Parliamentary Systems
Bangladesh follows a parliamentary model inspired by the Westminster system, where:
The Executive is drawn from the Legislature and accountable to it.
The President acts largely as a ceremonial head of state with formal powers exercised on the advice of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (Article 48 and Article 72).
The Judiciary retains independence but its power to review executive acts, including dissolution, depends on constitutional provisions and political will.
Loughlin (2010) notes that parliamentary democracies rely heavily on responsible government—the idea that executive power is legitimate only if accountable to Parliament. Hence, powers such as dissolution must be carefully regulated to prevent executive overreach.
3.3.3 The President’s Role and Limits in Bangladesh
Unlike presidential systems where the executive is separate, Bangladesh’s President holds constitutional authority within strict constraints. Article 72 codifies that the President can dissolve Parliament only on the Prime Minister’s advice, preventing unilateral action.
This limitation exemplifies how separation of powers adapts to:
-Prevent abuse of dissolution power.
-Maintain parliamentary sovereignty.
-Preserve constitutionalism.
3.4 Parliamentary Sovereignty and Executive Accountability
3.4.1 Parliamentary Sovereignty: Origins and Application
The principle of parliamentary sovereignty implies that Parliament is the supreme legal authority capable of creating or ending any law. While absolute sovereignty exists in some systems (e.g., UK), constitutional democracies like Bangladesh balance it with constitutional supremacy and fundamental rights (Dicey, 1885; Bogdanor, 2009).
In Bangladesh, the Parliament is the ultimate political authority, reflected in:
-The power to legislate without external override.
-The ability to hold the executive accountable through confidence votes.
-Control over the duration of its own term, with dissolution governed constitutionally.
3.4.2 Executive Accountability and the Doctrine of Advice
The executive (Prime Minister and Cabinet) is accountable to Parliament. The President’s role, though constitutionally empowered with formal acts, is bound by the Prime Minister’s advice, reinforcing political accountability (Article 72(1)).
This doctrine ensures:
-The executive cannot dissolve Parliament arbitrarily.
-Parliamentary confidence is necessary for government legitimacy.
-The President’s role is to formalize, not initiate, dissolution.
3.5 Judicial Review and Constitutional Interpretation
The role of courts in enforcing constitutional limits and adjudicating disputes over dissolution power is critical in reinforcing constitutionalism.
3.5.1 Judicial Review: Concept and Scope
Judicial review is the process by which courts assess the constitutionality of legislative and executive actions (Marbury v. Madison, 1803). In Bangladesh, courts have intermittently reviewed dissolution orders and emergency provisions, though political pressure sometimes constrains judicial independence (Rahman, 2012).
3.5.2 Bangladesh Judicial Practice
Notable cases have clarified the President’s limitations:
-Ershad v. Bangladesh (1991) reaffirmed that emergency powers must be exercised within constitutional bounds.
-Khaleda Zia v. State demonstrated judicial willingness to review dissolution legitimacy.
Yet, courts remain cautious, often deferring to political actors during crises (Hossain, 2016).
3.6 The Doctrine of Necessity and Its Critiques
The doctrine of necessity is a legal principle permitting extralegal actions to restore order during crises. Though invoked in Bangladesh (e.g., military coups, caretaker government formations), it poses risks of legitimizing unconstitutional acts.
3.6.1 Origin and Application
Originating from common law, the doctrine justifies temporary suspension of laws in emergencies (Chief Justice Muhammad Munir in Mian Abdur Rashid vs. State). In Bangladesh, this doctrine has been applied controversially to justify dissolution and suspension of constitutional norms (Rahman & Islam, 2019).
3.6.2 Critiques and Democratic Risks
Critics argue the doctrine undermines constitutionalism by providing a legal fig leaf for authoritarianism (Choudhry, 2008; Hashmi, 2010). Its overuse may erode public trust and destabilize democratic institutions.
3.7 Comparative Constitutionalism: Lessons from South Asia
Comparative perspectives highlight how constitutional powers related to dissolution differ across South Asia.
3.7.1 India
India’s President can dissolve the Lok Sabha on the advice of the Prime Minister, but the office holds discretionary powers in rare circumstances (e.g., hung parliaments) (Austin, 1999). Judicial review is robust, and the doctrine of constitutional morality prevails.
3.7.2 Pakistan
Pakistan’s President has historically wielded more discretionary power, including dissolution under Article 58(2)(b), leading to multiple dismissals of elected governments (Ahmed, 2005). Constitutional reforms post-18th Amendment curtailed these powers.
3.7.3 Sri Lanka
Sri Lanka’s President, under its semi-presidential system, holds substantial powers, including dissolving Parliament, though these are subject to judicial and parliamentary constraints (Perera, 2021).
3.8 Theoretical Synthesis and Application to Bangladesh
Synthesizing the above, Bangladesh’s constitutional framework for dissolution:
-Upholds parliamentary sovereignty by binding the President’s dissolution power to the Prime Minister’s advice.
-Embodies constitutionalism by limiting executive discretion and promoting rule of law.
-Integrates separation of powers adapted to a parliamentary system.
-Relies on judicial review and constitutional adjudication to enforce limits.
-Risks erosion by informal political practices, necessitating robust reforms.
The theoretical framework grounding this research integrates constitutionalism, separation of powers, parliamentary sovereignty, and judicial oversight as central pillars. These concepts explain the normative limits on the President’s power to dissolve Parliament under Article 72, reinforcing the democratic ideal of executive accountability and constitutional supremacy.
The research therefore proceeds with an analytical lens focused on how these theoretical principles operate in practice within Bangladesh’s constitutional order, judicial practice, and political realities.
4. Research Methodology
This part outlines the research design, methodological framework, and data collection techniques used in analyzing the constitutional limitations on the dissolution of Parliament by the President of Bangladesh. Given the legal, political, and normative dimensions of Article 72 of the Constitution, this study adopts a qualitative, interpretative, and doctrinal research methodology. This approach allows for a comprehensive understanding of constitutional texts, judicial pronouncements, historical precedents, and political contexts in which the dissolution of Parliament has been debated or attempted.
The methodology is guided by five central research questions:
What is the legal and constitutional basis of the President’s power (or lack thereof) to dissolve Parliament in Bangladesh?
How has the doctrine of ministerial advice been interpreted in case law and constitutional theory?
What historical precedents exist regarding the dissolution of Parliament in Bangladesh?
How do comparative constitutional practices in other Westminster-style democracies contextualize the Bangladeshi case?
What are the implications of potential constitutional breaches for democratic governance in Bangladesh?
4.1 Research Design: Doctrinal Legal Analysis
The core methodology employed in this research is doctrinal legal analysis—also known as black-letter law research. This involves:
Systematic reading of the Constitution of Bangladesh, particularly Articles 48, 55, 56, and 72.
Examination of judicial decisions from the Supreme Court of Bangladesh interpreting the scope of presidential and prime ministerial powers.
Review of legal commentaries, scholarly articles, and constitutional treatises.
Doctrinal analysis is appropriate because this study seeks to interpret and evaluate what the law is, as articulated in legal texts and applied by courts (Hutchinson & Duncan, 2012). This method also enables normative critique—assessing whether legal provisions are coherent, democratic, and consistent with constitutionalism.
4.2 Methodological Framework: Interpretivism and Constructivism
Since this study also evaluates how legal norms operate in political and institutional practice, it incorporates a constructivist-interpretivist framework. This allows exploration of how key constitutional actors (Presidents, Prime Ministers, judges, civil society) interpret Article 72 in practice, particularly during moments of political transition or crisis.
According to Denzin and Lincoln (2011), interpretivist methodologies are useful in analyzing social and legal phenomena that are shaped by context, perception, and ideology. In this view, constitutional texts are not self-implementing; their meaning evolves through use, contestation, and reinterpretation.
Thus, the study combines textual legal analysis with socio-political interpretation to:
• Analyze how political power dynamics influence constitutional interpretation.
• Explore institutional behavior and procedural compliance (or non-compliance) with constitutional rules.
• Assess the effects of judicial decisions and constitutional amendments on presidential authority.
4.3 Data Sources and Collection
To ensure methodological rigor, the research draws from multiple data sources, triangulating legal documents, case law, and political analysis:
4.3.1 Primary Legal Texts
The Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh (especially Articles 48, 55, 56, 72).
Supreme Court rulings related to the executive-legislative balance (e.g., Secretary, Ministry of Finance v. Masdar Hossain, Abdul Mannan Khan v. Government of Bangladesh).
Official parliamentary proceedings during key episodes (e.g., 1996, 2007).
4.3.2 Judicial Opinions
Case law from the Supreme Court of Bangladesh (Appellate Division and High Court Division).
Case summaries and published judgments available through the Supreme Court website, Bangladesh Legal Information Institute (BDLex), and constitutional law digests.
4.3.3 Scholarly and Institutional Literature
Peer-reviewed academic articles from journals such as the Asian Journal of Comparative Constitutional Law, Journal of Democracy, and Bangladesh Journal of Law.
Books and treatises on Bangladeshi constitutional law (e.g., Ahmed, 2018; Islam, 2015).
Reports from institutions such as Transparency International Bangladesh, International Crisis Group, and UNDP.
4.3.4 Media and Public Discourse
Archival analysis of newspapers and editorials from key political moments.
Interviews and speeches of former Presidents and Prime Ministers (where available).
Content from watchdog organizations and think tanks.
This multimodal data collection ensures both doctrinal accuracy and contextual richness.
4.4 Case Study Approach
To supplement the doctrinal analysis, the research adopts a case study method, focusing on three key constitutional moments:
-1996 Transition Crisis: Resignation of Parliament and the caretaker government debates.
-2007 Caretaker Government and Presidential Overreach: President Iajuddin Ahmed’s assumption of the Chief Adviser’s role.
2014–2024 Presidential Conduct and Parliamentary Dissolution Debates: Tensions between opposition calls for dissolution and executive resistance.
Each case is analyzed in terms of:
-Legal basis and constitutional procedure.
-Political context and motivations.
-Institutional behavior and compliance with Article 72.
-Role of judiciary, media, and public opinion.
This approach provides empirical grounding to the legal and theoretical analysis and demonstrates how Article 72 functions in political practice.
4.5 Comparative Methodology
The research also employs comparative constitutional analysis to situate Bangladesh’s Article 72 within the wider tradition of Westminster democracies. Specifically, the study examines:
-India: Article 74(1) and judicial interpretation (e.g., Samsher Singh v. State of Punjab, 1974).
-United Kingdom: Royal prerogative and conventions regarding Prime Ministerial advice.
-Pakistan: Article 48 and its historical misuse under presidential regimes.
This comparative lens:
-Reinforces the normative significance of ministerial advice.
-Highlights the dangers of presidential discretion in dissolving elected legislatures.
-Provides best practices and lessons for constitutional reform in Bangladesh.
-The methodological rigor in this comparative approach is ensured by using peer-reviewed legal scholarship and judicial precedents from respective jurisdictions.
4.6 Ethical Considerations
Although the study primarily involves document analysis, ethical concerns remain pertinent, especially in interpreting politically sensitive constitutional crises. Key ethical principles followed include:
• Academic neutrality: Avoiding partisan interpretation or advocacy.
• Source integrity: Citing only verified and credible documents and judgments.
• Respect for institutional dignity: Recognizing the symbolic value of the presidency while critiquing misuse.
• Where interviews or public statements are referenced, proper attribution and contextualization are maintained to prevent misinterpretation.
4.7 Limitations of the Methodology
While this research seeks comprehensive analysis, it is not without limitations:
• Access to confidential proceedings: Some aspects of presidential advice or internal cabinet deliberations are unavailable due to official secrecy.
• Judicial politicization: Case law may reflect political biases, especially during politically charged periods.
• Generalizability: The Bangladesh context may not fully reflect the theoretical ideals of Westminster models due to socio-political peculiarities.
• Data gaps: Some older legal documents or presidential records are not digitized or archived effectively.
These limitations are acknowledged and mitigated through cautious interpretation and methodological triangulation.
4.8 Research Validity and Reliability
To ensure validity, the research maintains:
• Consistent interpretation of constitutional provisions using legal canons of construction (literal, purposive, and historical).
• Corroboration across multiple sources: legal texts, judicial interpretation, political commentary.
• Contextual analysis to account for deviations between law and practice.
For reliability, the research methodology is documented in detail to allow replication or critical review by future scholars. Peer-reviewed literature and judicial records provide a stable evidentiary foundation.
4.9 Contribution to Scholarship
This methodological design aims to contribute to constitutional law and political science literature in several ways:
-By clarifying the doctrinal limitations on presidential authority in Bangladesh.
-By documenting how political practice can diverge from constitutional ideals.
-By offering comparative insights to inform constitutional reform and judicial accountability.
-By enriching academic discourse on democratic consolidation in South Asia.
5. What the Constitution Says
5.1 Introduction
The ability of the President of Bangladesh to dissolve Parliament is not only a constitutional question but also a subject of extensive judicial scrutiny, political controversy, and comparative constitutional debate. While Article 72(1) of the Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh explicitly mandates that the President must act on the advice of the Prime Minister, there have been notable political crises and litigations that have challenged or clarified this mandate.
This part analyzes major constitutional case laws, empirical political events, and offers comparative insights through constitutional tables to show how Bangladesh’s framework fits within the broader South Asian and Commonwealth constitutional tradition. The part is divided into:
• Judicial precedents from Bangladesh
• Interpretative frameworks emerging from the courts
• Political case studies involving dissolution or its threats
• Comparative constitutional provisions across select countries
A synthesized table of powers
5.2 Judicial Precedents in Bangladesh
5.2.1 Secretary, Ministry of Finance v. Md. Masdar Hossain (1999)
Although this case primarily dealt with the separation of the judiciary from the executive, the Supreme Court elaborated on the fundamental structure of the Constitution. The verdict reaffirmed that constitutional actors must function within the confines of their legally defined mandates, and any deviation—whether by the executive, legislature, or judiciary—undermines the supremacy of the Constitution (Hossain, 2000). By extension, the President’s authority is restricted by the constitutional requirement of Prime Ministerial advice under Article 72.
5.2.2 Abdul Mannan Khan v. Government of Bangladesh (2003)
This case emphasized the primacy of the parliamentary system, reiterating that the President is not an independent executive authority but a ceremonial figurehead expected to act on ministerial advice. The Court clarified that the language of Article 72(1) makes it obligatory for the President to dissolve Parliament only if advised by the Prime Minister (Ahmed, 2008). Any unilateral action would constitute a constitutional breach.
5.2.3 Advocate Asaduzzaman Siddiqui v. Bangladesh (2014)
In this case, involving disputes over electoral legitimacy and government transition, the High Court reaffirmed the constitutional centrality of the Prime Minister. While the case did not directly deal with dissolution, the Court indirectly touched upon executive dominance and the ceremonial nature of the Presidency.
5.2.4 BNWLA v. Bangladesh (2009)
This case involved constitutional interpretation in the context of women’s rights but laid down a key interpretative approach: constitutional provisions must be read purposively and in harmony with democratic principles (Khan, 2010). This interpretative method is useful when analyzing Article 72 in tandem with Article 48 (President’s role) and Article 55 (Prime Minister’s authority).
5.3 Interpretation of Article 72: Jurisprudential Analysis
Judicial interpretation of Article 72 reflects a strict textualist and purposive approach. Courts in Bangladesh have made it clear that:
The President has no discretionary power to dissolve Parliament.
Any attempt to do so without advice from the Prime Minister would be ultra vires (beyond legal power).
The Supreme Court retains the power of judicial review to invalidate such an act.
This interpretation is consistent with the doctrine of constitutional supremacy outlined in Article 7 of the Constitution, which states that all organs of the state must act in accordance with the Constitution. The President acting unilaterally would be tantamount to a violation of this principle (Mahmud, 2013).
5.4 Political Crises and Executive Behavior: Data Analysis
While case law provides a formal interpretation of the law, political crises in Bangladesh reveal how constitutional norms are often tested in practice. Here we examine four key events where the issue of Parliament’s dissolution or presidential overreach became politically significant.
5.4.1 Crisis of February 1996
Following the resignation of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) government and the controversial general elections of February 1996, there were widespread demands for the President to dissolve Parliament and form a neutral caretaker government. The refusal of the then-President to act without Prime Ministerial advice, despite enormous political pressure, highlighted the rigidity and stability of Article 72. Ultimately, it was parliamentary negotiations—not presidential intervention—that led to fresh elections in June 1996 (Jahan, 2011).
5.4.2 Caretaker Government Crisis (2007–2008)
In this period, President Iajuddin Ahmed controversially assumed the role of Chief Adviser, effectively taking control of both the Presidency and the executive. While Parliament was not formally dissolved by him, the military-backed regime operated under a constitutional gray area. This event exposed how informal power dynamics can challenge constitutional provisions. 5.4.3 January 2014 Elections and AL-BNP Deadlock
In 2014, amid boycotts and electoral controversies, there were again calls for presidential intervention. However, the President, bound by constitutional constraints, did not dissolve Parliament or suspend elections. This inaction reinforced the formality of the President’s role, though it drew criticism for being passive in a democratic crisis (Transparency International, 2014).
5.4.4 The 2024 Post-August Unrest
Following the mass protests and violent unrest after August 5, 2024, parts of civil society and opposition parties called for Parliament’s dissolution. The President’s refusal—citing constitutional limitations—sparked debate on whether formalism in constitutional interpretation was failing the democratic process. However, legal analysts maintained that the President had no legal right to dissolve Parliament unilaterally, regardless of the public mood (Mazumder, 2024).
5.5 Comparative Constitutional Tables: South Asia and Commonwealth
To contextualize Bangladesh’s Article 72 within global and regional constitutional traditions, we analyze similar provisions in selected countries.
5.5.1 Comparative Table: Dissolution Powers of Heads of State
| Country | Dissolution Power | On Advice of PM | Judicial Review Allowed | Notable Case Law / Event |
| Bangladesh | Only on PM’s advice (Art. 72) | Yes | Yes | (Art. 7) Abdul Mannan Khan v. GoB (2003) |
| India | Yes (Art. 85), on PM’s advice | Yes | Limited (political questions) | Samsher Singh v. Punjab (1974) |
| UK | Yes (Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011 repealed 2022) | Yes (de facto) | No (convention-based) | Boris Johnson prorogation (2019) |
| Sri Lanka | Executive Presidency – can dissolve with constraints | No | Yes (19A, now reversed) | 2018 Constitutional Crisis |
| Malaysia | Yes – on PM’s advice | Yes | Limited | 2020 Political Realignment |
| Pakistan | Yes (Art. 48), PM’s advice but history of misuse | Yes | Yes (post-18th amendment) | Benazir Bhutto cases; Nawaz Sharif 1993 |
5.5.2 Key Learnings from Comparative Analysis
Bangladesh and India adhere to a strict parliamentary model with ceremonial presidencies and binding advice.
The UK relies on conventions and political trust, which has occasionally resulted in controversy (e.g., 2019 prorogation found unlawful by UK Supreme Court).
Sri Lanka presents a hybrid model, demonstrating the danger of overconcentration of power in an executive presidency.
Pakistan’s history reflects constitutional abuse, leading to major amendments and stronger judicial review.
These comparisons support the Bangladeshi model’s emphasis on democratic continuity and Prime Ministerial supremacy, though enforcement mechanisms remain critical.
5.6 Synthesis: Rule of Law, Presidential Restraint, and Democratic Governance
From both domestic case law and comparative models, it is evident that:
• The President’s power to dissolve Parliament is intentionally restricted to protect against authoritarian drift.
• Judicial decisions in Bangladesh have consistently supported this constitutional design, despite political challenges.
• Political events sometimes test the resilience of these norms, but legal provisions remain structurally firm.
• Comparative experiences validate the Bangladeshi approach as consistent with parliamentary democratic ideals.
• The judiciary’s role as a gatekeeper against ultra vires actions remains vital to prevent unconstitutional dissolutions.
The balance between the symbolic authority of the President and the political mandate of the Prime Minister is a cornerstone of Bangladesh’s parliamentary democracy. Through constitutional provisions, judicial interpretation, and comparative analysis, it is clear that the President’s inability to dissolve Parliament without the Prime Minister’s advice is not merely a procedural formality but a critical safeguard for democratic stability.
However, the persistence of extra-constitutional pressures, informal power dynamics, and weak institutional accountability continues to pose risks. Therefore, strengthening democratic culture, ensuring judicial independence, and improving civic awareness of constitutional limitations are imperative.
6: Policy Recommendations and Strategic Interventions
Safeguarding Constitutional Integrity: Strategic Interventions to Prevent Unilateral Dissolution of Parliament in Bangladesh
6. 1 Introduction
Bangladesh’s constitutional framework has established a parliamentary democracy where the President is a largely ceremonial figure, bound to act on the advice of the Prime Minister, especially regarding the dissolution of the Jatiya Sangsad (National Parliament). However, political volatility and authoritarian tendencies have occasionally pressured the constitutional balance. This part presents concrete policy recommendations and strategic interventions to prevent misuse or unilateral overreach concerning parliamentary dissolution, aiming to strengthen democratic norms, constitutional rule, and institutional accountability.
6. 2. Strengthening the Separation of Powers and Institutional Checks
6. 2.1 Codifying Presidential Powers through Clearer Amendments
While Article 72 of the Constitution limits the President’s authority, ambiguities in interpretation can be exploited. A strategic recommendation is to introduce a constitutional amendment explicitly prohibiting any dissolution of Parliament without written advice from the Prime Minister ratified by Cabinet approval.
Recommendation: Amend Article 72 to insert a clause requiring the President to publish the Prime Minister’s written advice as a gazette notification before Parliament can be dissolved.
This echoes practices in other Westminster-model democracies such as India and the UK, where constitutional conventions and legal interpretations restrict discretionary powers of ceremonial heads of state (Choudhry, 2006).
6.2.2 Establishing a Constitutional Oversight Committee
A bipartisan, parliamentary constitutional oversight committee should be formed to review any recommendations for dissolution. This would serve as a buffer mechanism, ensuring broader consultation and accountability in matters of national significance.
6.3 Reinforcing Judicial Safeguards and Review Mechanisms
6.3.1 Fast-Track Constitutional Courts for Presidential Overreach
Bangladesh lacks a dedicated constitutional bench for urgent review of executive overreach. Establishing such a bench under the Supreme Court, with authority to hear dissolution-related petitions within 72 hours, would deter illegal actions.
Case Reference: Sheikh Hasina v. Bangladesh, where emergency powers were challenged, shows that judiciary intervention can reverse unlawful executive orders (Rahman, 2012).
6.3.2 Automatic Review Mechanism
A provision should be introduced mandating automatic judicial review by the Appellate Division if Parliament is dissolved under extraordinary conditions, such as political instability, emergency declaration, or contested electoral mandates.
6.4 Promoting Parliamentary Autonomy and Internal Renovation
6.4.1 Ensuring Fixed Parliamentary Terms
Bangladesh should consider transitioning toward a quasi-fixed parliamentary term model, similar to the UK’s Fixed-term Parliaments Act (2011), where dissolution is permitted only under defined scenarios like two-thirds majority vote or a no-confidence motion.
Comparative Insight: This model offers stability and reduces the ruling party’s capacity to call snap elections for political gain (Norton, 2013).
6.4.2 Preventing Political Capture of the Speakership
The Speaker of Parliament must be given enhanced independence from ruling party influence. Legal reforms could limit party-affiliated appointments and introduce procedures akin to secret ballots for Speaker selection, thus insulating the office from executive coercion.
6.5 Depoliticizing the Presidency
6.5.1 Transparent Presidential Selection Process
While the President is elected by Parliament, the process is typically controlled by the majority party. A reform proposal would involve a cross-party nomination committee to ensure the election of a non-partisan candidate.
Theoretical Basis: Drawing from the concept of “constitutional neutrality” (Barendt, 1998), such reforms reduce the politicization of constitutional roles.
6.5.2 Restricting President’s Emergency Powers
Article 141 of the Constitution provides sweeping powers under emergency rule. Revisions should prevent any use of emergency as grounds for parliamentary dissolution, unless confirmed by a two-thirds vote in Parliament and subsequent judicial approval.
6.6. Promoting Civic Literacy and Public Accountability
6.6.1 Constitutional Education Initiatives
Civil society organizations and state institutions must launch public education campaigns about the limitations of presidential power and parliamentary sovereignty. A constitutionally aware public is better positioned to resist unconstitutional moves.
Empirical Insight: In post-authoritarian democracies like South Korea and Indonesia, civic literacy programs have been essential in curbing elite overreach (Diamond, 2008).
6.6.2 Establishing a Citizen’s Constitutional Grievance Mechanism
A public grievance redressal system should be institutionalized, allowing any citizen to file constitutional violations—especially related to parliamentary dissolution—via ombudsman or the National Human Rights Commission.
7. International Engagement and Best Practices
7.1 Regional Peer Review Mechanisms
Bangladesh should participate in a regional peer-review mechanism (similar to the African Peer Review Mechanism under the African Union) for constitutional governance to share lessons and receive warnings in the event of political overreach.
7.2 Engagement with the Commonwealth Secretariat
The Commonwealth’s Latimer House Principles promote separation of powers and judicial independence. Bangladesh can institutionalize these frameworks as part of its commitment to democratic constitutionalism (Commonwealth Secretariat, 2003).
8. Role of Academia, Think Tanks, and the Media
8.1 Think Tank Involvement in Constitutional Reform Proposals
Academic institutions such as the University of Dhaka’s Law Department or BILIA (Bangladesh Institute of Law and International Affairs) should be empowered to propose, review, and assess the constitutional ramifications of any presidential actions.
8.2 Responsible Media Framing
The media must be sensitized to responsibly report on matters involving constitutional crises without sensationalism. Strategic partnerships between the Election Commission, Press Council, and constitutional experts can create guidelines for crisis communication.
9. Conclusion
The constitutional structure of Bangladesh, while parliamentary in nature, remains vulnerable to executive overreach and political manipulation. A proactive policy framework, encompassing constitutional reform, judicial activism, public education, and institutional neutrality, is essential to uphold the spirit of democratic governance. The recommendations laid out herein aim not only to prevent unilateral dissolution of Parliament but also to foster constitutional resilience in times of political uncertainty.
Conclusion and Future Research Directions
1. Summary of Key Findings
This research has critically examined the constitutional position of the President of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh in relation to the dissolution of Parliament under Article 72 of the Constitution. The central argument established is that the President does not possess unilateral authority to dissolve the Jatiya Sangsad (National Parliament); such power must be exercised on the advice of the Prime Minister.
Several interrelated insights emerged from the literature review, theoretical analysis, and case studies:
• Constitutional Design and Executive Boundaries: The Constitution of Bangladesh adopts a parliamentary form of government, drawing heavily from the Westminster model but adapted within a unique South Asian political context. This arrangement places substantive executive power with the Prime Minister, relegating the President to a mostly ceremonial role. This has legal and normative implications on the power to dissolve Parliament.
• Article 72 and Its Interpretive Clarity: Article 72(1) states explicitly that the President may dissolve Parliament only on the advice of the Prime Minister, unless exceptional conditions apply (e.g., the expiration of the term or inability to form a government). Even in politically unstable situations, the Constitution reaffirms the necessity of executive accountability through parliamentary supremacy.
• Comparative Insights from Pakistan, India, and Sri Lanka: In examining comparative constitutional frameworks, the study reveals that South Asian constitutions often retain strong symbolic heads of state with limited de facto authority. Bangladesh, though constitutionally distinctive, aligns closely with India in preserving parliamentary sovereignty over executive and presidential discretion.
Judicial Precedents and Doctrinal Trends: Bangladeshi courts, while occasionally used for partisan adjudication, have largely upheld the constitutional limits on the President’s discretion, particularly in dissolution matters (e.g., Ershad v. Bangladesh, Khaleda Zia v. State). However, legal ambiguities still exist, especially in interpreting presidential action during states of emergency or transitional power vacuums.
Political Context and Informal Power Structures: The Yunus Interim Episode post-5 August 2024 has highlighted the dangerous implications of undermining constitutional norms under the guise of civilian-military consensus or NGO-legal activism. In such contexts, the role of the President can become distorted, particularly if constitutional procedures are bypassed under emergency doctrines or “doctrine of necessity” justifications.
2. Broader Implications for Democratic Governance
The current constitutional and political dynamics of Bangladesh underscore several broader implications:
•Rule of Law versus Rule by Law: The stability of parliamentary democracy depends on adherence not just to the text of the law, but to the spirit of constitutionalism. If the President acts beyond the advice-based framework of Article 72, it risks undermining democratic legitimacy and enabling authoritarian reversals.
• Civil-Military-Administrative Nexus: The informal yet powerful interpart of bureaucracy, military, and private capital (e.g., development NGOs) increasingly influences constitutional norms. This hybrid regime configuration can instrumentalize the presidency to impose technocratic or extra-political control—threatening electoral sovereignty.
• Resilience of Institutions: While Bangladesh’s Parliament, Judiciary, and Election Commission often operate under stress, the long-term viability of democratic institutions requires transparent checks and balances, respect for constitutional advice mechanisms, and judicial independence in times of crisis.
• Public Trust and Political Narratives: Repeated use of ambiguous powers by unelected authorities—whether Presidents or military-bureaucratic alliances—erodes public faith in electoral politics. Social media and rumor-based politics, as seen post-2024, only intensify constitutional confusion.
3. Challenges and Limitations of the Study
While this research has made a comprehensive attempt to analyze constitutional and political dynamics regarding presidential authority in Bangladesh, several limitations are noted:
-Documentary and Judicial Record Access: Many presidential decisions and advisories are not publicly accessible, making it difficult to reconstruct exact motivations or political backchanneling.
-Evolving Political Crises: The rapid political developments in Bangladesh, including shifting alliances, defection politics, and backdoor diplomacy, mean that constitutional interpretations may evolve fluidly with changing power contexts.
-Limited Access to Elite Testimonies: Key political actors, legal drafters, or interim technocrats were unavailable for interviews, limiting the qualitative depth of some analyses.
-Comparative Complexity: While India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka provide comparative models, their presidential-parliamentary dynamics differ contextually and historically, reducing the generalizability of certain frameworks.
4. Future Research Directions
Building on this work, several avenues for future exploration are proposed:
a) Presidential Discretion and Emergency Powers
Future studies could explore the president’s role during national emergencies, particularly in relation to Article 141 (emergency provisions) and its possible manipulation in political transitions.
b) Constitutional Amendments and Legal Reforms
A systematic evaluation of the 15th, 16th, and other major constitutional amendments may offer insight into how the balance of power between the executive and legislature has shifted over time—especially in relation to caretaker government provisions and judicial authority.
c) Role of Digital Media in Constitutional Crises
The impact of social media, algorithmic amplification, and disinformation networks on public perception of constitutional processes—including presidential actions—deserves in-depth interdisciplinary study.
d) Presidential Power in Postcolonial Democracies
Bangladesh’s experience can be fruitfully compared with Nepal, Bhutan, and Myanmar, to understand how postcolonial governance structures distribute ceremonial versus effective power among state organs.
e) Transitional Justice and Doctrine of Necessity
Further investigation into the doctrine of necessity and how it has been judicially abused or normalized to justify extra-parliamentary dissolutions can inform both domestic reforms and international jurisprudence.
5. Concluding Remarks
In conclusion, this study affirms that the President of Bangladesh is not constitutionally empowered to dissolve Parliament without the advice of the Prime Minister, reinforcing the supremacy of parliamentary accountability within the nation’s democratic architecture. However, in the complex political theater of Bangladesh—where informal power often overshadows formal structures—constitutional clarity must be reinforced through legal reform, institutional autonomy, and civic education. The recent events surrounding the Yunusian Interim Government and the post-5 August 2024 constitutional crisis illustrate the dangers of bypassing democratic due process. Going forward, both legal scholarship and political practice must work toward safeguarding the Constitution as a living instrument of the people—not a pliable tool of power brokers.
The Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh was envisioned as a democratic framework built upon the principles of representative government, the rule of law, constitutionalism, and the separation of powers. At its core, Article 72 functions as a cornerstone in regulating the balance between the executive and the legislature by outlining the conditions under which the National Parliament (Jatiya Sangsad) may be dissolved. The central objective of this research has been to critically examine the constitutional and political dimensions of presidential authority in Bangladesh—particularly focusing on the President’s power (or lack thereof) to dissolve Parliament without the explicit advice of the Prime Minister.
Reasserting the Constitutional Hierarchy
This study reaffirms that Bangladesh operates under a parliamentary democracy, where the President acts as a constitutional head of state with limited discretionary power, and the real executive authority lies with the Prime Minister and the Cabinet (Articles 48 and 55 of the Constitution of Bangladesh, 1972). Within this structure, Article 72 categorically asserts that the President does not possess autonomous authority to dissolve the Parliament. The article clearly states that the President may dissolve Parliament only when advised by the Prime Minister, except in situations where dissolution results from the expiration of the Parliament’s term or other automatic constitutional triggers.
As demonstrated in the literature review and theoretical framework, this arrangement upholds the Westminster model of democracy, where the head of state must act on the advice of the elected executive, and unilateral actions by the President are deemed unconstitutional (Ahmed, 2012; Kabir, 2015). Thus, any deviation from this principle, including attempts by the President to bypass the Prime Minister’s advice, would constitute a breach of constitutionalism and could provoke a constitutional crisis.
Guardrails Against Executive Overreach
An essential conclusion of this study is that Article 72—when read in conjunction with Articles 48 and 55—acts as a safeguard against the personalization of executive authority. It ensures that the dissolution of Parliament, a profoundly impactful action in any democracy, cannot be used arbitrarily or politically weaponized by the President. This is crucial in a political culture often marred by authoritarian tendencies, power centralization, and executive overreach (Rashid, 2020).
The legal doctrine of separation of powers, which the Constitution of Bangladesh loosely incorporates, also supports this interpretation. In practice, however, the principle has often been subordinated to dominant political interests. The study’s comparative case law analysis reveals how constitutional structures alone are insufficient to prevent abuse; robust institutional independence and political accountability are also required.
Judicial Interpretation and Constitutional Review
This research has emphasized the potential role of the judiciary in checking unconstitutional dissolutions. Under Article 7 of the Constitution, all powers are derived from the people and exercised only in conformity with the Constitution, making unconstitutional actions challengeable before the courts. Cases like Abdul Mannan Khan v. Government of Bangladesh (2003) reaffirm that any action by the President that undermines parliamentary sovereignty without due process can be subject to judicial review.
However, the judiciary’s role in political matters remains contested. Comparative insights from India (Samsher Singh v. State of Punjab, 1974), Pakistan (Benazir Bhutto cases), and the UK (R (Miller) v. The Prime Minister, 2019) illustrate that while courts can intervene to prevent the erosion of constitutional norms, they often refrain from delving deep into “political questions”. In Bangladesh, the courts have historically oscillated between activism and restraint, often depending on prevailing political pressures and the composition of the judiciary (Moniruzzaman, 2009).
Comparative Insights and Regional Implications
A broader South Asian comparison underscores the critical nature of constitutional clarity and institutional resilience. In Pakistan, the misuse of dissolution powers by Presidents under Article 58(2)(b) prior to the 18th Amendment led to frequent dismissals of elected governments and political instability. Sri Lanka’s recent constitutional crises (2018) under an executive presidency model demonstrated how unchecked presidential authority can erode democratic norms.
In contrast, India—while not free of executive dominance—has generally upheld the primacy of constitutional provisions and the parliamentary system, largely due to stronger democratic traditions and institutional safeguards. The UK’s repeal of the Fixed-term Parliaments Act in 2022 reintroduced discretion to call elections, but such power remains constrained by conventions, parliamentary consent, and political norms.
Bangladesh, by contrast, stands at a critical juncture. Although the constitutional text provides a relatively clear roadmap, political culture, institutional weakness, and executive dominance threaten the spirit of the Constitution. This comparative lens reinforces that the letter of the law is insufficient without commitment to democratic values and procedural integrity.
Political Context and the Erosion of Norms
Another key insight from this research is the growing disconnect between constitutional form and political practice in Bangladesh. While the President is a nominal figurehead according to the Constitution, political narratives and extra-constitutional influences often try to elevate the office into a power broker, especially during political transitions or electoral deadlocks.
The recent debates and concerns surrounding “interim” or “caretaker” regimes, and attempts to use the presidency to bypass parliamentary procedures, have brought Article 72 into sharp focus. These dynamics are indicative of a wider crisis of democratic legitimacy, where legal frameworks are increasingly strained by political ambitions and weakening institutional checks.
The fear is not that the Constitution lacks clarity, but that political actors may no longer feel bound by it. In such a scenario, constitutional safeguards like Article 72 require more than textual reinforcement—they need cultural legitimacy, public awareness, and a judiciary willing to uphold democratic boundaries.
Future of Constitutional Governance in Bangladesh
Looking ahead, several imperatives emerge:
-Institutional Strengthening: The Parliament, Election Commission, and Judiciary must be insulated from partisan capture. Only then can they serve as effective arbiters of constitutional compliance.
-Constitutional Literacy: Both the public and political actors must be educated about constitutional provisions like Article 72 to prevent misinterpretation and manipulation.
-Legal Reform and Clarification: Though Article 72 is relatively clear, future reforms might consider elaborating the procedural thresholds for dissolution, borrowing best practices from India and the UK to strengthen procedural accountability.
-Judicial Independence: A judiciary empowered with tenure security, merit-based appointment, and institutional autonomy can better enforce constitutional limits.
-Civil Society Engagement: Watchdog organizations, academia, and the media must continue to monitor and challenge any attempts at constitutional manipulation.
Final Reflections
In conclusion, this research reaffirms that the President of Bangladesh cannot dissolve Parliament without the explicit advice of the Prime Minister, as per Article 72. This is not merely a procedural requirement—it is a reflection of the foundational democratic ethos upon which the Constitution was built. The President is not a parallel executive but a ceremonial guardian of constitutional continuity. Attempts to reshape or reinterpret this role outside the framework of Articles 48, 55, and 72 constitute a direct affront to the constitutional order.
As Bangladesh moves forward amidst increasing political polarization and institutional challenges, the real test will not lie in the interpretation of Article 72 alone, but in whether the nation’s political culture remains committed to the principles of constitutionalism, democratic accountability, and the separation of powers.
Only by reinforcing these values—in both spirit and practice—can Bangladesh hope to preserve the legitimacy of its constitutional democracy and prevent the resurgence of executive authoritarianism in new forms.
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