The period following August 8 last year has marked a profound turning point in Bangladesh’s internal security landscape. What was once considered a contained threat, violent extremism driven by radical Islamist networks, has resurfaced with renewed intensity, exploiting political uncertainty, institutional fragmentation, and a shifting ideological environment.
This report, “Resurgence of Extremism in Bangladesh during the Interim Government: An Assessment of Emerging Threats,” has been prepared to provide a clear, evidence-based assessment of this evolving situation for policymakers, security institutions, human rights bodies, and the broader international community.
In a stark warning to global stakeholders, the Global Center for Democratic Governance (GCDG), a Canada-based think tank focused on democratic resilience, released this 42-page report today, detailing how the interim government under Chief Adviser Muhammad Yunus has inadvertently—or perhaps deliberately—fostered an environment ripe for Islamist revival.
Drawing on verified incidents, expert consultations, field observations, and historical analysis, the document paints a picture of a nation teetering on the edge of theocratic transformation, with profound implications for South Asian stability.
Institutional Vacuum Fuels Radical Revival
The report’s executive summary sets the tone: since Yunus’ installation on August 8, 2024, following the ouster of former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina amid student-led protests, Bangladesh has experienced “profound institutional disruption” and a “weakened security structure.” Key counterterrorism units, including the Counter Terrorism and Transnational Crime (CTTC) unit, have been gutted through transfers and sidelining of experienced professionals, creating an “operational vacuum” that banned groups have swiftly exploited.
Central to this resurgence is the public return of Hizb ut-Tahrir Bangladesh (HuT), a radical outfit banned since 2009 for promoting caliphate ideologies. The group’s “March for Khilafat” rally in Dhaka in March 2025—attended by hundreds chanting for an Islamic caliphate—marked a defiant open-air demonstration, the first since its prohibition. Despite police intervention with tear gas, resulting in over 10 injuries and 36 arrests, the event underscored “extreme confidence in operational freedom,” per the report.
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HuT’s strategy now includes aggressive campus recruitment at universities, leveraging youth disillusionment from the 2024 unrest, and a booming digital footprint with radical videos circulating unchecked on social media.
Broader mobilisation extends to Hefazat-e-Islam, a madrasa-based network reconstituting grassroots influence through hardline preaching and policy dictation. One Hefazat deputy chief was appointed as Adviser for Religious Affairs, enabling the group to scrap music education in primary schools—labelled an “anti-Islamic agenda”—and demand annulment of women’s reforms in a May 2025 “Grand Rally.”
Jamaat-e-Islami (JI), historically linked to 1971 war crimes, saw its ban lifted in August 2024, allowing massive rallies and cross-faction alliances with other Islamists. Security analysts cited in the report warn of “a coordinated, multi-pronged Islamist revival,” amplified by transnational ties, including Al-Qaeda praise for Bangladesh’s “victory for Islam” via its As-Sahab media wing.
Ideological Infiltration and Social Fallout
Perhaps most alarming is the “ideological infiltration” of state institutions. The report documents appointments of Islamist sympathisers to advisory and judicial roles, alongside purges of secular military officers—over 150 implicated in October 2025 trials for “crimes against humanity.” This echoes Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps model, eroding Bangladesh’s secular bulwarks. Local administrators, fearing reprisals, exhibit “passive compliance,” ceding space to radicals.
The social toll is devastating. Religious minorities—Hindus (8% of the population), Christians, Buddhists, Ahmadis, and indigenous groups—faced 2,442 attacks from August 2024 to June 2025, per the Bangladesh Hindu Buddhist Christian Unity Council. This includes 258 communal assaults in early 2025 alone, 20 rapes, and 59 temple desecrations. The Yunus regime’s denial—framing incidents as “political” rather than communal—has bred impunity, with only 88 cases officially acknowledged by December 2024.
ইউনূসের জিহাদি শাসনব্যবস্থাকে 'খুনি-ফ্যাসিবাদী' হুমকি হিসেবে অভিহিত করেছে আওয়ামী লীগ
CTTC being gutted as Yunus regime brands militants as Islamic scholars
Free expression has contracted sharply. Journalists and poets face arrests under vague “hurting religious sentiments” charges; poet Sohel Galib was detained in February 2025 for a poem deemed blasphemous, while Hindu monk Chinmoy Krishna Das’s November 2024 sedition arrest sparked protests. The draft Cyber Protection Ordinance (2025) retains repressive provisions from the scrapped Cyber Security Act, stifling dissent.
Gender norms are regressing amid moral policing by groups like “Touhidi Janata.” Women report harassment for attire, and the Hefazat-led backlash derailed the Women’s Affairs Reform Commission, branding advocates as “prostitutes.” The report links this to “deeply ingrained patriarchy” and weakened enforcement, warning of eroded progress on women’s rights.
Key Incidents: A Timeline of Escalation
The report chronicles a litany of violence, underscoring the regime’s “incoherent response.” From August 2024’s post-uprising chaos (1,400 deaths) to Hathazari Madrassa’s Shia-Sunni clashes in September—evoking “ISIS-style barbarism” with anti-Hindu chants—extremism has surged. The October 2025 factory arsons in Chittagong, suspected sabotage targeting economic stability, compounded by military purges, signalled institutional collapse.
November’s bomb blasts at Dhaka’s Holy Rosary Church and St. Mary’s Cathedral, uninvestigated, flooded social media with “exterminate infidels” calls. National crime stats reveal 4,177 murders and 216 mob lynchings from September 2024 to October 2025.
Mob violence has targeted cultural pluralism, demolishing 185 Sufi shrines and 1,494 monuments. Baul singer Abul Sarkar’s November 2025 arrest for “insulting Islam” during a folk performance exemplifies this: a fragmented video clip sparked charges, followed by Touhidi Janata assaults on supporters, injuring seven. Over 359,798 arbitrary arrests since August—mostly Awami League affiliates—highlight selective justice.
Regional Ripples and Regime Denial
Geopolitically, Yunus’s pivot—warming ties with Pakistan, China, and Turkey while demanding Hasina’s extradition—strains India’s relations. Anti-India rhetoric, including Jamaat calls for “jihad,” revives ISI operations: 125 recruits trained in border camps for northeastern incursions, per intelligence reports. Rohingya camps double as jihad hubs, risking spillover to Myanmar and ASEAN.
Yunus’ denial—”youth are neutral about religion”—dismisses evidence as “exaggerated propaganda,” prioritising Awami League trials over extremism. This “active enablement,” the report argues, risks theocratic drift, polarisation, and destabilisation.
Urgent Call for Course Correction
GCDG concludes Bangladesh faces an “irreversible threshold”: without restoring CT capacities, banning extremists, protecting minorities, and rebuilding secular ties, it could become “South Asia’s next Iran—a jihadist bridgehead.” The report urges international intervention: UN human rights probes, targeted sanctions on enablers, and support for democratic restoration.
As Yunus’ tenure stretches toward the 2026 elections, the clock ticks. “Time is not on Bangladesh’s side,” warns the preface. For a nation born in 1971’s secular blood, this resurgence isn’t just a crisis; it’s an existential pivot.
This article draws exclusively from the GCDG report, available at www.globalcdg.org.
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