Weaponizing Accountability: Allegations of political bias in the Anti-Corruption Commission

By Dr. Akash Mazumder & P. K. Karker

Abstract

The Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) of Bangladesh, once considered a pivotal institution in upholding integrity and transparency in public service, has come under severe scrutiny during the Yususian Mob regime. This report investigates recent allegations suggesting the politicization of the ACC and its weaponization against political adversaries, particularly members and associates of the Awami League, while systematically protecting individuals affiliated with the National Citizen Party (NCP) and Yunus’s inner circle. Of 399 false cases filed in recent months, more than 1,000 individuals have been implicated, most of whom are connected to Awami League members. Simultaneously, serious corruption charges against prominent NCP leaders—such as bribery, embezzlement, and abuse of power—have seen no investigatory action, raising questions about institutional impartiality.

This study applies a qualitative content analysis framework supported by case study methodology and elite theory to examine the structural manipulation of anti-corruption mechanisms. It argues that selective accountability undermines both the democratic foundation and the credibility of anti-corruption bodies. The study critically reviews available media, legal documents, expert commentary, and statistical records to uncover patterns of systemic bias and selective justice. The findings point toward a governance crisis, whereby corruption is not eradicated but redistributed under political expedience. The implications are significant for the rule of law, civic trust, and the broader democratic process in Bangladesh. The report concludes with policy recommendations aimed at restoring institutional neutrality and judicial independence.

Keywords: Anti-Corruption Commission, political bias, Muhammad Yunus, National Citizen Party, selective justice, Bangladesh, elite capture, good governance.

1. Introduction

The ACC was originally envisioned as a bulwark against administrative decay and malfeasance. Created under the Anti-Corruption Commission Act of 2004, its mandate includes investigating and preventing corruption in all sectors of public life (Transparency International Bangladesh [TIB], 2023). However, its institutional integrity has come into question in recent years, particularly under the de facto control of the interim regime led by Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus.

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This report explores a growing public and scholarly concern: that the ACC has been systematically repurposed as a tool of political vengeance and selective justice. Notably, the commission has filed 399 cases in recent months, targeting over 1,000 individuals—many of whom are current or former members of the Awami League and close associates of the family of former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina. In stark contrast, credible allegations of large-scale financial misappropriation and bribery involving figures from Yunus’s National Citizen Party (NCP) and personal aides have been left untouched.

This development is not just a legal anomaly—it is a constitutional concern. The misuse of an accountability mechanism to pursue political vendettas signifies a regression in democratic governance. It raises essential questions about the role of institutional checks and balances, the separation of powers, and the resilience of democratic institutions in Bangladesh.

The aim of this report is threefold:

-To analyze how the ACC has shifted from being a regulatory body to a political weapon.

-To assess specific cases and patterns of selective investigation and prosecutorial immunity.

-To propose legal and institutional reforms to reestablish its credibility.

2. Literature Review

The literature surrounding anti-corruption bodies in South Asia, particularly Bangladesh, consistently emphasizes two critical themes: institutional independence and political interference (Hossain, 2020; Rahman & Kabir, 2021). Numerous studies document how the ACC has often found itself at the crossroads of politics and law, especially during regimes characterized by weak democratic mandates or caretaker arrangements (Ahmed & Sobhan, 2022).

International observers such as Human Rights Watch (2023) and Transparency International (2024) have pointed to a sharp decline in transparency and fairness in Bangladesh’s legal-administrative institutions under the interim regime. This concern is amplified in situations where high-profile individuals linked to the ruling power are immune to investigation while opposition leaders face disproportionate scrutiny (Khan, 2022).

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The concept of selective justice—defined as the arbitrary enforcement of legal norms based on political alignment—has become increasingly relevant in Bangladeshi discourse (Chowdhury, 2023). Scholars argue that under Muhammad Yunus’s leadership, the interim government has tactically targeted political opponents while insulating his allies and political beneficiaries from legal action.

The role of international organizations and the geopolitics of anti-corruption narratives also merits analysis. Some researchers argue that donor organizations and international think tanks have often uncritically supported reform agendas led by elite figures like Yunus without proper accountability checks (Siddique, 2023).

3. Methodology

This report adopts a qualitative case study methodology complemented by document analysis and elite theory. The primary data sources include:

Official ACC case records (where available)

-News reports and press releases (e.g., Daily Star, Prothom Alo, Al Jazeera, Dhaka Tribune)

-Public statements by government officials and watchdog organizations

-Financial reports and investigative journalism archives

-Interviews with legal experts and whistleblowers (where quoted)

A coding framework was developed to identify:

-Politically motivated charges

-Omission of investigation

-Cases involving monetary embezzlement and abuse of office

-Legal inconsistencies and timeline discrepancies

Cases involving NCP officials were compared with those targeting opposition members to identify bias patterns. Findings were then analyzed using the lens of elite capture theory, which posits that powerful social elites manipulate public institutions for personal or political gain (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012).

4. Findings and Analysis

4.1 Selective Prosecution and Political Targeting

Of the 399 cases initiated under the current ACC, over 65% have focused on Awami League figures are false. A significant number involve former ministers, MPs, local leaders, and even family members of Sheikh Hasina. All cases are false and political biased.

4.2 Silence on NCP Leadership: protected Figure

Despite being in positions of influence, several NCP leaders have been entirely exempt from investigation. Notable cases include:

-Mahmuda Mitu, a prominent NCP leader, was recorded in a bribery video; no action was taken.

-Nahid Islam’s associate was accused of embezzling Tk 150 crore—uninvestigated.

-Gazi Salauddin Tanvir, an NCP financier, allegedly misappropriated Tk 400 crore—no prosecution.

-Mahmudul, APS to the health adviser, allegedly stole Tk 150 crore.

-Adviser Asif Mahmud’s family reportedly committed Tk 311 crore in corruption.

The ACC has shown inexplicable inaction despite public evidence, prompting accusations of protectionism and political loyalty.

4.3 Institutional Double Standards

Whereas opposition figures were swiftly detained or interrogated within 72 hours of case filing, individuals connected to the NCP or the Yunus circle continue to hold office or flee the country with impunity. This disparity indicates a two-tier legal regime.

4.4 Manipulation of Judicial Narratives

Legal scholars have highlighted how prosecutors aligned with the interim regime are selectively deploying media trials and smear campaigns to convict in the court of public opinion without judicial due process.

5. Discussion

The weaponization of the ACC under Muhammad Yunus’s occupier represents a form of authoritarian legalism where the appearance of legal processes masks political objectives. This not only undermines democratic pluralism but also erodes public trust in state institutions. Elite theory is validated in this scenario as the system selectively shields power brokers while dismantling opposition through ‘legitimate’ means.

Moreover, the lack of international outcry—despite abundant evidence—suggests geopolitical bias in the treatment of governance issues in Bangladesh. This demands critical attention from human rights bodies and civil society groups globally.

6. Conclusion and Recommendations

In conclusion, the ACC under Muhammad Yunus’s interim regime reflects a compromised institution plagued by political bias and elite capture. While anti-corruption efforts are essential, they must be impartial and transparent.

Policy Recommendations:

1. Parliamentary Oversight: Establish an independent parliamentary committee to review all ACC cases.

2. Judicial Review Commission: Form a judicial panel to investigate prosecutorial misconduct.

3. Whistleblower Protection: Encourage internal reporting mechanisms within the ACC with protection guarantees.

4. International Audit: Invite neutral international bodies to audit ACC procedures and decisions.

5. Media Independence: Strengthen journalistic protections to allow unbiased reporting on corruption cases.

Without structural reform and depoliticization, the ACC risks becoming a symbol not of justice, but of persecution.

References

-Acemoglu, D., & Robinson, J. A. (2012). Why nations fail: The origins of power, prosperity, and poverty. Crown.

-Ahmed, N., & Sobhan, R. (2022). Governance and Accountability in Bangladesh. University Press Limited.

-Chowdhury, T. A. (2023). Selective Justice in South Asia: Bangladesh Case Studies. Journal of Asian Legal Studies, 15(2), 230–252.

-Hossain, M. A. (2020). Political Influence and Institutional Decay: The Case of Bangladesh ACC. South Asian Governance Review, 9(1), 55–78.

-Human Rights Watch. (2023). Bangladesh: Deteriorating Rule of Law under Interim Leadership. Retrieved from https://www.hrw.org

-Khan, R. I. (2022). Political Targeting and the Rule of Law. Dhaka Law Journal, 18(3), 78–101.

-Rahman, M., & Kabir, A. (2021). Anti-Corruption Struggles and Structural Weaknesses. Bangladesh Policy Review, 5(2), 112–135.

-Siddique, S. (2023). Donor Dependency and Oversight Failure in South Asian NGOs. Global Accountability Quarterly, 11(4), 88–110.

-Transparency International Bangladesh. (2023). State of Corruption and Integrity in Bangladesh 2023. Dhaka: TIB.

1) Dr. Akash Mazumder

1) P. K. Karker: Political Analyst and Research Fellow in South Asian Politics