The arrest of 36 Bangladeshi workers in Malaysia highlights the persistent threat of extremism, potentially linked to Bangladesh’s violent anti-government movement in July 2024 and the chaos following the August 5 political upheaval.
The unconstitutional interim government led by Muhammad Yunus, accused of patronising militants and maintaining ties with groups like Jamaat-e-Islami and Hefazat-e-Islam, raises concerns about a state-sponsored radical agenda with regional and international implications.
The detainees were workers involved in fundraising for the Islamic State (IS), channelling funds to Syria and Bangladesh, according to Inspector-General of Police Mohd Khalid Ismail.
Reported by Reuters and detailed in a televised press conference, this operation underscores a decade-long trend of Bangladeshi jihadists using Malaysia as a safe haven, amplifying fears of militant infiltration following Bangladesh’s recent political changeover.
The release of al-Qaeda-affiliated Ansar al-Islam leader Jasimuddin Rahmani, the government’s alleged support for radical Islamists, and a recent Mecca meeting of prominent Islamists signal a dangerous escalation. Critics fear the Yunus-led interim government may be complicit in fostering extremism.
Malaysian crackdown and the GMRB network
From April 28 to June 21, 2025, Malaysian police conducted a multi-phase operation, arresting 36 Bangladeshi nationals, aged 25 to 35, in Johor and Selangor. These factory, construction, and service workers were part of the “Gerakan Militant Radical Bangladesh” (GMRB), which recruited members via WhatsApp and Telegram, requiring a RM500 annual fee and additional donations.
The network, estimated at 100 to 150 members, funnelled funds through international transfers and e-wallets to IS operatives in Syria and Bangladesh, though the exact amounts remain under investigation.
Five detainees face terrorism charges, 15 are slated for deportation, and 16 await further scrutiny. Khalid emphasised that no attacks were planned in Malaysia, with the group focusing on recruitment and ideological dissemination.
Bangladesh’s Law Adviser, Asif Nazrul, expressed concern, noting that three of the 15 deported detainees were interrogated upon return.
“If we find evidence, either independently or from Malaysian authorities, we will bring them to justice,” Nazrul said, stressing zero tolerance for militancy and ongoing high-level cooperation with Malaysia.
This operation echoes a 2016 crackdown following an IS-linked attack in Kuala Lumpur, where hundreds were detained. Malaysia’s reliance on foreign labour, including thousands of Bangladeshi workers annually, has created fertile ground for radicalisation.
Historical cases, such as the 2016 Holey Artisan Bakery attacker Nibras Islam and Ansarullah Bangla Team (ABT) leader Redwanul Azad Rana, who both fled to Malaysia, underscore this trend.
A Malay Mail report noted over 50 arrests of Bangladeshi extremists between 2016 and 2023, with figures like Professor Rezaur Razzak of the radical NGO Rural Community Development further entrenching extremist networks.
Post-August 5 exodus: A new wave of militants?
The timing of this network’s exposure raises questions about its origins. The August 5, 2024, changeover in Bangladesh, when Sheikh Hasina fled amid a student uprising, triggered chaos: prisons were looted, arms were stolen, and militants escaped.
Among them was Jasimuddin Rahmani, who was released in August 2024 after securing bail in terrorism cases, including the 2013 murder of blogger Ahmed Rajib Haider. After his release, Rahmani attended many religious events (waz) and detailed how the series of murders took place till 2016 based on his sermons and a book. He hinted at a stronger jihadist movement in the future.
Rahmani’s May 2025 rally speech in Shahbagh, calling for a ban on the Awami League, signals his renewed influence and the government’s patronisation of militancy.
Concerns are mounting that some of the 36 detained in Malaysia may have arrived post-August 2024, exploiting the turmoil to flee Bangladesh. Nazrul’s recent meeting with Lashkar-e-Tayyiba militant and Hefazat-e-Islam leader Mufti Harun Izhar, coupled with assurances to release other radical Islamists, fuels allegations of government ties to Jamaat-e-Islami and Hefazat.
Critics argue that the Yunus regime is empowering extremist factions, rebranding them as “Touhidi Janata” to mobilise mobs for anti-Awami League and anti-India campaigns—a tactic reminiscent of the BNP-Jamaat alliance’s 2001–06 tenure.
Islami Andolan Bangladesh’s vision
The rise of Islamist influence in Bangladesh’s political sphere adds another layer to the growing concerns about extremism. Since August 2024, prominent extremist leaders, including Jasimuddin Rahmani (Ansar al-Islam), Mufti Harun Izhar (Hefazat-e-Islam), Asif Adnan, Abu Twaha Adnan, Ahmadullah, Mamunul Haque (Hefazat-e-Islam), and members of Jamaat-e-Islami, have publicly advocated for Sharia law in Bangladesh, intensifying fears of a radical shift.
These figures, alongside Syed Muhammad Faizul Karim of Islamic Movement Bangladesh, are pushing for a governance model akin to Afghanistan’s Taliban-led system.
On the Khaled Muhiuddin talk show on July 1, 2025, Faizul Karim declared that if his party wins the national election, it will introduce Sharia law, incorporating elements from Iran and “good things” from countries like the United States, England, and Russia that align with Sharia.
He assured that Hindus and other minorities would have rights under this system, though critics warn of a regressive turn.
His appearance on the talk show, broadcast live on the Khaled Muhiuddin YouTube channel, highlighted the IAB’s growing prominence.
On June 28, 2025, several Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami leaders attended the IAB’s grand rally in Dhaka, signaling a potential electoral alliance between the two Islamist parties.
However, tensions persist, as Faizul Karim referenced a five-year-old statement calling Jamaat “enough to destroy Islam,” refusing to retract it despite the recent collaboration.
He clarified that any consensus with Jamaat would not compromise either party’s ideology, indicating a pragmatic but uneasy partnership.
The rally also saw participation from parties like the NCP and Gono Odhikar Parishad, but notably excluded the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP).
Faizul Karim explained that only parties supporting the proportional voting (PR) system for election reform were invited, and the BNP’s disagreement on this issue led to its exclusion.
He further criticised the BNP for “extortion, party conflicts, fights, and disputes,” positioning himself as a spokesperson for public discontent. These developments suggest that the Islamic Movement is carving out a distinct role in Bangladesh’s fractured political landscape, potentially amplifying Islamist influence ahead of elections.
Karim also addressed the destruction of over 100 shrines by the so-called Touhidi Janata during the interim government’s tenure, condemning the trend as misguided. He argued that shrines are not inherently harmful and urged dialogue to prevent such acts, distancing his party from mob-driven extremism while still advocating for a Sharia-based governance model.
This stance reflects the complex interplay of ideological rigidity and political pragmatism within Bangladesh’s Islamist factions.
A Mecca alliance and regional implications
The situation escalated with a recent Mecca meeting of prominent Bangladeshi Islamists, including Harun Izhar, Jamaat leaders, Ahle Hadith, Islami Andolan, and Jamaat-backed orator Mizanur Rahman Azhari.
The meeting reportedly aimed to forge a broader alliance to amplify their influence, potentially coordinating with Malaysian-based cells to enhance fundraising and recruitment. The Yunus government’s alleged backing of Jamaat and Hefazat, both historically linked to militancy, heightens fears of a state-sponsored radical agenda.
The Eurasian Times (2025) suggests that Yunus’s Western support may shield this strategy, though evidence remains circumstantial.
Malaysia’s Home Minister, Datuk Seri Saifuddin Nasution Ismail, vowed to prevent the country from becoming a militant base, collaborating with Interpol and foreign agencies. However, the porous migration of Bangladeshi workers—often undocumented—poses a persistent challenge.
If post-August 5 escapees are among the detained, it highlights a security lapse in Bangladesh, where the interim government’s focus on consolidating power may have neglected militant containment.
Governance and extremism
Critics argue that Yunus’s interim regime, lacking electoral legitimacy since August 2024, relies on Islamist support to maintain stability. The release of Rahmani and promises to free other radicals suggest a quid pro quo with groups like Hefazat, known for moral policing and anti-Hindu actions.
This mirrors the BNP’s 2001–06 use of Jamaat to counter the Awami League but employs a modern twist: social media-driven mobilisation of “Touhidi Janata” mobs.
The Malaysian case exposes a transnational threat. Funds sent to Bangladesh could bolster local cells, potentially linked to Rahmani’s ABT, while remittances to Syria sustain IS operations. The lack of transparency—Khalid’s refusal to disclose specific amounts—adds to the opacity.
If the Yunus government is indeed patronising these networks, it risks transforming Bangladesh into a militant hub, reversing gains from Hasina’s anti-terrorism efforts, which neutralised figures like Rana in 2017. Reports also suggest the interim government is supporting banned groups like Hizb ut-Tahrir, IS, JMB, the Rohingya group ARSA, Jamaat-Shibir, and Qawmi madrasa-based radicals.
Broader concerns and future risks
The interplay of domestic instability and regional extremism is alarming. India, wary of Bangladesh’s militancy, faces heightened border tensions, with anti-India rhetoric from Yunus-aligned mobs echoing past conflicts. Malaysia, despite its crackdown, may struggle to stem the tide if Bangladesh fails to address internal radicalisation.
The Mecca meeting, combined with the growing calls for Sharia law from figures like Rahmani, Izhar, and others, suggests a pan-Islamist ambition, potentially aligning with global jihadist movements.
For now, Malaysia’s swift action has disrupted the GMRB, but the root causes—unregulated migration and Bangladesh’s political vacuum—persist. The Yunus government’s trajectory, alongside the rising influence of groups like the Islamic Movement, will be decisive.
If it continues releasing militants and aligning with Jamaat, Hefazat, and other Islamist factions, the August 5 changeover could mark a turning point, not for democracy, but for the resurgence of extremism. International pressure and robust counter-terrorism cooperation are urgently needed to avert a regional crisis.
English